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INTRODUCTION
T he fair apportionment of cleanup costs among potentially re-
sponsible parties ("PRPs")1 poses perhaps the most difficult
problem in the administration of hazardous waste laws in the Unit-
ed States.2 In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA3 in response to a
series of major environmental disasters4 and increasing concern re-
* J.D. Candidate 1997, Fordham University School of Law.
1. PRPs are those parties who fall within one of the categories of persons
liable under § 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The statute lists as PRPs any present or past owner or operator of a hazardous
waste site, anyone who arranged for disposal of wastes at the site, or anyone who
transported wastes to the site. CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-
(4) (1988). For a full discussion of the § 107 liability scheme see infra part I.
2. See Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund: A
Critique of the Redistribution of CERCLA Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 36, 37
(1994); Superfund: Cost Allocation Issue Most Difficult Problem Under
Superfund, House Panel Told, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 400 (May 22, 1992). The
Clinton Administration has proposed amending CERCLA to apportion liability
more equitably among PRPs, but these efforts have failed to yield results. See
Daniel M. Abuhoff and Harry Zirlin, Apportionment of Liability Addressed in
CERCLA Bill, N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1994, at S6.
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
4. See Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability For HazardousSubstance Cleanups
Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 65, 68
(1992) ("Several well-publicized incidents of improper disposal of large amounts
of hazardous substances which caused serious public health problems sparked
interest in and support for this legislation. Among these incidents were Love
Canal in New York, the 'Valley of the Drums' in Kentucky, and the James River
kepone (sic) discharges in Virginia."). For a compilation of infamous environ-
mental disasters, see Barry Commoner, A Reporter at Large: The Environment,
NEW YORKER, June 15, 1987, at 46.
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garding hazardous waste sites. From its inception, CERCLA was
recognized as an imprecise tool for addressing the environmental
threat posed by the multitude of hazardous waste sites throughout
the United States.' Corporations, investors, and individual litigants
soon learned that through CERCLA, the federal government sought
to remove this threat to "human health and the environment"6 with-
out delay, and with little regard for the costs private parties would
incur.7
Through CERCLA, Congress intended to facilitate the cleanup of
locations contaminated by hazardous substances,8 to place the ulti-
5. CERCLA was hurriedly adopted during the closing days of the Democrat
controlled 96th Congress. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund")
Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1982). Courts have criticized
CERCLA as poorly drafted, hastily considered, and lacking a useful legislative
history. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has
acquired a well deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefi-
nite, if not contradictory, legislative history."); see also Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA
Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923 (1990)
(summarizing cases construing and applying CERCLA from 1980 to 1990).
6. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) ("Whenever... any
hazardous substance is released.., into the environment.., the President is
authorized to ... take any other response measure ... which the President
deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.").
7. The estimated cost of hazardous waste cleanup nationwide may be greater
than the cost of bailing out the nation's savings and loan institutions. See Healy,
supra note 4, at 67. When first enacted in 1980, CERCLA provided a mechanism
for shifting cleanup responsibility from the government to private sector parties,
but failed to explain how to allocate the expenses among the numerous private
parties who bore some statutory relationship to the hazardous substance problem.
See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 38.
8. The term "hazardous substance" is defined in CERCLA § 101(14), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). The definition incorporates by reference the substances
listed as hazardous or toxic under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(a),
1321(b)(2)(a) (1994), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1988 & Supp. V
1993), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 6921
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606
(1994). Section 102(a) of CERCLA also authorizes the EPA to list additional
substances that "may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or
the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1988). Generally, the EPA lists only
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mate financial burden on those responsible for the danger created
by such sites,9 and to promote voluntary cleanup efforts.' ° The
CERCLA program "substantially changed the legal machinery used
to enforce environmental cleanup efforts and was enacted to fill
gaps left in ... the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 ("RCRA") .... 11
CERCLA's statutory scheme includes four fundamental elements:
(1) a system for information gathering and analysis allowing the
EPA to monitor levels of hazardous waste at sites throughout the
nation;' 2 (2) federal authority to respond to hazardous substance
specific wastes that are either "acutely hazardous or possess high levels of toxic
constituents." Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. United States EPA, 976 F.2d
2, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1961 (1993). A substance may be
considered hazardous if it contains one of four properties: corrosivity, ignitability,
reactivity, or toxicity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-.24 (1994). See Roslyn K. Meyers,
Note, Advanced Chemical Fingerprinting In Hazardous Waste Liability Under
CERCLA, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 253, 265 (1995) (discussing the application of
advanced chemical fingerprinting for identifying hazardous wastes).
9. O'Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989) ("It has not gone
unnoticed that holding defendants jointly and severally liable ... may often result
in defendants paying for more of their share .... Nevertheless, courts have con-
tinued to impose joint and several liability ... reasoning that where all of the
contributing causes cannot fairly be traced, Congress intended for those proven at
least partially culpable to bear the cost of the uncertainty."), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1071 (1990).
10. See infra notes 262-83 and accompanying text.
11. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The
RCRA left inactive sites largely unmonitored by the EPA unless they posed an
imminent hazard .... CERCLA addressed this problem 'by establishing a means
of controlling and financing both governmental and private responses to hazard-
ous releases at abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites."') (quoting Bulk
Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984)).,
12. CERCLA §§ 102-103, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9602-9603 (1988). The system re-
quires the owners of hazardous waste sites to notify EPA of the nature of the
hazardous substances stored at those sites, thus enabling EPA to compile a list of
problem sites, assess their relative danger to the public, and develop response
plans. Id. The reporting requirements pursuant to CERCLA, contained in section
102(b), provide in relevant part:
Unless and until superseded by regulations establishing a reportable quantity
["RQ"] under subsection (a) of this section for any hazardous substance as de-
fined in section 9601(14) of this title, (1) a quantity of one pound, or (2) for
those hazardous substances for which reportable quantities have been established
440 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
release 3 and to compel responsible parties to undertake cleanup
efforts; 4 (3) the Superfund, a taxation provision to finance EPA
activity, and to some extent, the cleanup of orphan toxic waste
sites;'5 and (4) provisions governing liability. 6
When Congress reauthorized CERCLA with the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"),'17 it
sought to refine this powerful but imprecise instrument for remov-
ing hazardous substances from the environment. 18 The issue of
pursuant to section 1321(b)(4) of Title 33, such reportable quantity, shall be
deemed that quantity, the release of which requires notification pursuant to sec-
tion 9603(a) or (b) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9602(b) (1988). Section 103(a) requires the person in charge of a
facility to notify EPA immediately following any release of a hazardous sub-
stance in a quantity equal to or exceeding the RQ for that substance. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603(a) (1988); see Ferrey, supra note 2, at 41.
13. CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988); see Ferrey, supra note 2, at
41.
14. CERCLA § 106 authorizes EPA to compel parties to respond to the re-
lease of hazardous substance and enjoin them from further violating CERCLA's
mandates. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988). Failure to comply with EPA § 106 orders
"without sufficient cause" may result in a fine of up to $25,000 per day and puni-
tive or treble damages. Id. See Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck
Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1992). A standard of ob-
jective reasonableness applies. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. United States EPA,
812 F.2d 383, 390-91 (8th Cir. 1987); Ferrey, supra note 2, at 41.
15. The popular name "Superfund" is derived from the "Hazardous Substance
Response Trust Fund" that initially allocated $1.6 billion to finance the imple-
mentation of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
16. See infra parts II and III; Ferrey, supra note 2, at 41.
17. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 and other provisions of the U.S.C.) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
SARA repealed CERCLA's Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund and in its
place established the "Hazardous Substance Superfund" under Subchapter A of
Chapter 98 of the Internal Revenue Code, adding $8.5 billion and imposing taxes
on petroleum products and certain inorganic chemicals. I.R.C. § 9507(a) (1988).
In addition, the Superfund receives all recoveries and penalties paid by PRPs, as
well as monies collected under § 31 l(b)(6)(B) of the Clean Water Act. 26 U.S.C.
§ 9507(b)(2)-(5) (1988); see Barr, supra note 5, at 953; Ferrey, supra note 2, at
41.
18. See Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. ENENCO, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 528 n.3 (6th Cir.
1993) ("By passing SARA, 'Congress sought to better define cleanup standards,
to expand resources available to EPA for investigations and cleanups, to clarify
EPA's authority under Superfund law, and to expand and clarify the states' role
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apportioning liability among PRPs under CERCLA remains unre-
solved, however, primarily because jurisprudence on the issue is
still in its infancy. 9 The absence of definitive guidance from Con-
gress has resulted in discord among recent court decisions and has
propelled the issue of apportioning liability to the forefront of
CERCLA litigation.0
The difficulty in apportioning liability often occurs after the gov-
ernment has targeted a site for cleanup. The EPA has several over-
lapping statutory avenues for approaching a hazardous waste site."'
The EPA may, pursuant to CERCLA § 104,12 undertake emergen-
cy removal23 and remediation"4 measures after determining that a
in any remedial action undertaken, or ordered by EPA."') (quoting United States
v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1417 (6th Cir. 1991)). SARA
also delegated more responsibility to EPA and allotted more time and money for
cleanup to compensate for Congress's extreme underestimation of cleanup costs.
William A. White, Reauthorization Overview: EPA's Perspective, 5 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 299, 300 (1994). Congress again reauthorized CERCLA in 1990 by
adding an extension of the operating authority for the Superfund to a revenue bill,
I.R.C. § 9507(a) (1988), adding $11.5 billion to fund the program through 1994,
and adding taxing authority through 1995. Id.
19. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 40. See Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the
Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relationship Between Equity and Efficien-
cy, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1053-54 (1994) (analyzing the economic con-
sequences of judicial decisions on the theory that PRPs are more likely to settle
with EPA if the alternative is more expensive than settling).
20. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 38; Healy supra note 4, at 65; see generally Ste-
ven F. Baicker-McKee & James M. Singer, Narrowing the Roads of Private Cost
Recovery: Recent Developments Limiting the Recovery of Private Response Costs
Under CERCLA § 107, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,593 (November
1995) (analyzing disparities among federal courts in deciding whether PRPs may
sue under § 107(a)).
21. See generally United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429, 432 (1st
Cir. 1990) (outlining various approaches EPA may implement in responding to
hazardous waste release).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
23. "Removal" measures are generally those measures intended as short-term
efforts to remove hazardous substances from a site. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988);
see Barr, supra note 5, at 973.
24. "Remediation" measures are long-term or permanent measures intended to
remedy the damaged environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988). The remedial
process includes the investigation and selection of the remedy in a "Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study", a "Work Plan", and the "Record of Decision",
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hazardous waste site threatens human health and the
environment.25 The EPA may also issue a § 10626 administrative
order compelling a party to perform its own cleanup, or seek an in-
junction whereby a court "may grant such relief as the public inter-
est and the equities of the case require. 27 In all cases, § 10728
provides for recovery of the EPA's response coStS29 from PRPs.
The broad CERCLA liability scheme imposes strict,30 retroac-
tive,3' and joint and several liability.32 The policies and practical
aspects of CERCLA permit the government to focus on a few fi-
nancially viable PRPs who may have contributed a substantial share
of the waste.33 PRPs targeted by the government or who voluntari-
along with the design,' contracting, construction, operation, and maintenance phas-
es at a site. See Barr, supra note 5, at 973-76.
25. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
27. Id.; see Barr, supra note 5, at 933.
28. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
29. "Response costs" include the cost of investigating, monitoring, testing, and
evaluating a toxic waste site, as well as the costs of actual removal of the hazard-
ous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); see Barr, supra note 5, at 968-72; United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
30. For a full discussion of strict liability under CERCLA, see infra notes 53-
60 and accompanying text.
31. Courts agree that CERCLA imposes liability retroactively for acts com-
mitted prior to the statute's effective date. United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical and Chem. Co., 801 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987) ("Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for
retroactiv[e liability,] it is manifestly clear that Congress intended CERCLA to
have retroactive effect... [because the] liability provision ... refers to actions
and conditions in the past tense."); see Organ, supra note 19, at 1042 n.19; Barr,
supra note 5, at 982-83.
32. For a full discussion of joint and several liability under CERCLA see
infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
33. The combination of EPA's lack of resources and its ability to utilize joint
and several liability militate against EPA compilation of more comprehensive
PRP lists at each site. See Organ, supra note 19, at 1042, 1054; Karen L. Demeo,
Note, Is CERCLA working? An Analysis of the Settlement and Contribution Pro-
visions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 493, 503 (1994) ("[lIt is not unusual for the EPA
to identify the minimum number of parties to commence an action."). As a result
the burden of remediation falls on those whom EPA has identified. Id. EPA has
recognized this problem, but has been unsuccessful in providing a solution. Or-
gan, supra note 19, at 1042. Although the scheme receives criticism for the high
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ly clean up, then face the precarious task of attempting to apportion
their costs among other liable parties.34
CERCLA authorizes two types of legal actions which allow par-
ties to recover cleanup expenses: cost recovery actions under
§ 107(a),35 which impose joint and several liability, and contribu-
tion actions under § 113(f),36 which impose only several liabili-
ty.37 The section under which a plaintiff proceeds significantly
affects parties' rights concerning the scope of the defendant's liabil-
ity, the plaintiff's burden of proof, the applicable statute of limita-
tions, and the availability of defenses.38 Under the § 107 cost re-
covery action, a plaintiff may shift virtually all of its CERCLA
liability to the defendant with a relatively light burden of proof.39
In contrast, the § 113(f) contribution action only permits plaintiffs
to recover the defendant's equitable share of the response costs, and
imposes a more stringent burden of proof.'
Courts are split over whether or not a PRP may bring a § 107
cost recovery action. The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits,4 along with a number of district courts,42 have
transaction costs it imposes on PRPs, it should be noted that it forcefully pro-
motes fundamental changes in people's behavior with respect to the generation
and disposal of hazardous waste. See White, supra note 18, at 301.
34. Demeo, supra note 33, at 503.
35. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For a full discussion of the cost
recovery action see infra part I.
36. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988). For a full discussion of
contribution see infra part II.
37. Id.
38. See infra parts I, II.
39. See infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
41. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. ENENCO, Inc., 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993);
General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); but see Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C.
Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Litton Indus., but characterizing
allocation as a contribution dlaim controlled by § 113(f) where the trial judge al-
located a 33% share of response costs to defendant).
42. United States v. J.M. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995); Barmet
Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley & Sons, 914 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Ky. 1995);
United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-5118, 1995 WL
510304, 510380 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1995); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis
Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Companies For Fair Alloc'n v.
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allowed PRPs to sue other PRPs for cost recovery, while the Courts
of Appeals for the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, 4 and a num-
ber of district courts" permit only the government and "innocent
parties" to seek cost recovery, relegating PRPs to § 113(f) contribu-
tion claims.' This contradictory jurisprudence has introduced sig-
nificant unpredictability into the CERCLA liability allocation pro-
cess.
46
This Note examines the division among the courts of appeals and
district courts with respect to the availability of the § 107(a) cost
recovery action to PRPs. Part I analyzes the expansive § 107(a)
cost recovery action. Part II discusses the more limited § 113(f)
contribution action. Part III examines the situations in which courts
Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D. Conn. 1994); Barton Solvents, Inc. v. South-
west Petro-Chem, Civ. A. No. 91-2382-GTV, 1993 WL 382047 (D. Kan. Sept.
14, 1993); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,
814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992); Transportation Leasing Co., v. Caltrans, 861
F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.
N.J. 1991).
43. United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995);
United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,
30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d
746 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994) (allowing PRP Amcast to
sue Detrex under § 107(a)).
44. See Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 901 F. Supp. 906 (M.D.
Pa. 1995); New Castle County v. Halliburton Nus Corp., 903 F. Supp. 771 (D.
Del. 1995); Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Utah 1995);
Reichold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Fla. 1995); T.H.
Agric. & Nutrition Co. v. Aceto Chem. Co., 884 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Cal. 1995);
Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079 (D. N.J.
1992), appeal dismissed, 5 F.3d 51 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2692
(1994).
45. In addition, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have indirectly ruled against PRP
cost recovery. The weight afforded to these decisions is questionable at best. See
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Dant &
Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Daniel D. Barnhizer, Recent
Development, Joint and Several Liability and Contribution Under CERCLA Sec-
tions 107(A)(4)(B) and 113(f), 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 563, 576 (1994) ("Nei-
ther of these courts ... appears to have closely examined the issue. Instead, the
courts simply stated a cursory conclusion.").
46. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 66.
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have limited the option of bringing cost recovery actions to "inno-
cent parties" and the government, forcing PRPs to sue under the
more restrictive contribution action. Part IV surveys the courts that
have allowed PRP cost recovery actions and analyzes the courts'
reasoning. Finally, Part V concludes that allowing PRPs to bring
cost recovery actions under § 107 better serves the congressional
goals embodied in CERCLA by encouraging rapid voluntary clean-
up of hazardous waste sites.
I. COST RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 107(A)
The first liability provision listed in CERCLA, § 107, provides a
broad means for the government and some private parties 47 to sue
PRPs to recover the costs incurred from hazardous waste cleanup.
The liability provision of § 107(a) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses' set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility, 49
47. Courts generally agree that § 107 expressly permits a private right of
action for cost recovery. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792
F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling that § 107 "expressly creates a private
cause of action for damages."); Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("It is difficult for the Court to
imagine statutory language that would more clearly grant a private cause of ac-
tion."); Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (ruling that CERCLA provides an action where a party seeks to recover
response costs from responsible parties). An implied right to contribution also
stems from § 107. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994)
(recognizing implied right of contribution under § 107). Nevertheless, the ques-
tion presented in this Note, whether a PRP may seek cost recovery, remains unre-
solved.
48. To establish a defense to liability, a defendant must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the release of a hazardous substance and the resulting
damages "were caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; [or] (3) an
act or omission of a third party . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
49. CERCLA defines a "facility" as "any building, structure, installation,
equipment, pipe, or pipeline ... , well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch,
landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or... any site
or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988). See
Barr, supra note 5, at 960-61.
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(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazard-
ous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise a r -
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter
for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous s u b -
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of re-
sponse costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all cost of the removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State ... not inconsistent
with the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan . . .
Bringing suit under this section provides the best available means
for recovering the costs incurred from cleanup because the provi-
sion imposes strict, retroactive, and joint and several liability on
the defendant, subject to only limited defenses.5 Nevertheless,
recent court decisions have failed to set a predictable standard for
determining if non-governmental parties may utilize § 107 cost
recovery.52
A. Strict Liability
An "overwhelming body of precedent.., has interpreted
§ 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme."53 In addition
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The National Contingency Plan ("NCP") consists of
a lengthy set of regulations promulgated by EPA which generally contain (1)
methods for discovering and investigating facilities at which hazardous substances
are found, (2) methods for evaluating and responding to releases and threatened
releases of hazardous substances, (3) criteria for determining the appropriate ex-
tent of removal or remediation, and (4) criteria for determining remediation prior-
ities among the releases or threatened releases throughout the nation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a)(l)-(3), (8) (1988). See Barr, supra note 5, at 972-76.
51. See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
52. See infra parts III, IV, V.
53. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
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to the judicial sentiment that Congress intended § 107 liability to
be strict, the statute itself provides that the standard of liability in
CERCLA actions shall be that which governs actions under § 311
of the Clean Water Act,54 to which courts have applied strict
liability." Under this standard there is no scienter require-
ment.56 To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff need only
prove that it has incurred response costs resulting from a re-
lease57 or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); see Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain
Corp., 987 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Under 42 U.S.C. § 9607, liabili-
ty ... for CERCLA response costs is a matter of strict liability.") (citations omit-
ted); accord Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d
1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805
(S.D. Ohio 1983). Although Congress did not expressly provide that CERCLA
imposes strict liability on PRPs, the legislative history evinces a clear legislative
intent to impose such liability. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10
(1980). Congress likened hazardous waste disposal to common law ultrahazardous
activity. Id.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
55. See Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir.
1978).
56. See Healy, supra note 4, at 86; Barr, supra note 5, at 976.
57. "Release" means "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emp-
tying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and
other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or con-
taminant) .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988). The statute fails to provide any
quantitative requirement on the term "release," however, courts generally construe
this term broadly "to avoid frustrat[ing] the beneficial legislative purposes."
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc. 889 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986)) (citations omitted); Barr, supra note 5, at 966-68; Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1038-39 (including leaking tanks and pipelines); Vermont v. Staco, Inc.,
684 F. Supp. 822, 832-33 (D. Vt. 1988) (defining the migration of hazardous
chemicals to public and private sewer systems as a "release," and defining poten-
tial leaching of mercury from septic systems into ground water as "threatened
release"); United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (D.
Ariz. 1984) (including "transport" asbestos blown by the wind). See also Amoco,
889 F.2d at 667 (discussing CERCLA's liability provisions and ruling that a
plaintiff need not demonstrate that radioactive emissions exceeded a quantitative
threshold to establish a release under CERCLA §9607(a)(4)).
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facility, and that the defendant is a person defined in § 107(a). 8
A plaintiff need not show that the defendant's acts directly
caused the plaintiff to incur response costs. 59 Thus, the defen-
dant will be liable regardless of fault, and "regardless of negli-
gence by owners, operators, transporters, or generators."
6
B. Joint and Several Liability
CERCLA does not explicitly allocate liability among multiple
parties. The courts, however, with subsequent congressional ap-
proval,61 have interpreted § 107(a) to allow plaintiff recovery of
all response costs jointly and severally from any PRP named in
the suit.62 The theory of joint and several liability provides that
58. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 719-20 (2d
Cir. 1993); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 411 (D. N.J. 1991);
Ferrey, supra note 2, at n.43; Anne D. Weber, Note, Misery Loves Company:
Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1469, 1474 (1989).
If the plaintiff establishes each of these elements and the defendant fails to estab-
lish one of the § 107(b) defenses, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment
on the issue of liability. Amoco, 889 F.2d at 668.
59. Numerous courts have ruled that Congress specifically rejected any causa-
tion requirement for CERCLA liability. See, e.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044
(discussing existence of a causation requirement that Congress deleted from an
early House version of the CERCLA bill); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283,
1291-93 (D. R.I. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff's causation arguments); United States
v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that the federal gov-
ernment can recover cleanup costs by demonstrating that a defendant at one time
disposed waste at the site and the same type of hazardous substances are present
at the site).
60. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991);
Ferrey, supra note 2, at 47.
61. During SARA's passage, Congress referred to United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983), as the seminal case which im-
poses joint and several liability. In Chem-Dyne, the court reviewed the legislative
history of CERCLA and concluded that although Congress deleted reference to
joint and several liability from the Act, this would not preclude courts from using
it as the standard of liability. Id. at 808. The court further noted that rather than
imposing a mandatory standard, Congress chose to permit the exercise of judicia-
ry discretion in necessary instances. Id.; see also, R. Lisle Baker and Michael J.
Markoff, Note, By-Products Liability: Using Common Law Private Actions To
Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 99 (1986).
62. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
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if two or more individuals cause a single and indivisible harm,
each is subject to liability for the entire harm.63 Consequently,
under this theory a single PRP may bear the total burden of
CERCLA liability64 unless that PRP establishes a basis for divis-
ibility.65 Utilizing joint and several liability under the § 107(a)
cost recovery action significantly increases a plaintiff's chances
for recouping the large sums of money spent on cleanup. The
extent to which parties other than the government may sue for
cost recovery, however, remains unresolved.
The cost recovery action allows a plaintiff to compel PRPs to
share equally in the cleanup costs without proving each PRP's
proportional share' because, under joint and several liability, all
PRPs are liable for the entire costs of removal and
remediation. 67 A cost recovery plaintiff may spread the cost
among all identified PRPs, thus reducing its own burden to pay
for the orphan share - the unfunded response costs attributable
to any judgment-proof PRPs.68 Under CERCLA's liability
scheme, a § 107 defendant may then seek contribution under
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 n.13; United States
v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Chem-Dyne, 572 F.
Supp. at 806; see Barr, supra note 4, at 977-78; Lynda J. Oswald, New Direc-
tions In Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA?, 28 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV.
299 (1995).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977).
64. See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 47.
65. See O'Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[D]amages
should be apportioned only if the defendant can demonstrate that the harm is
divisible."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990). PRPs rarely escape joint and
several liability where they bear the burden of proving the divisibility of harm
defense. Id. at 178-79. See generally David Montgomery Moore, The Divisibility
of Harm Defense to Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA, 23 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 10529 (arguing that no defendant has ever successfully in-
voked this defense in a reported decision).
66. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
67. Ferrey, supra note 2, at 48 ("Plaintiffs ... are not required to link their
response costs with specific releases of particular defendant PRPs.").
68. See generally Daniel R. Hansen, CERCLA Cost Allocation and
Nonparties' Responsibility: Who Bears the Orphan Shares?, 11 U.C.L.A. J.
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 37 (1992) (arguing that courts should implement the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act as the federal rule for apportioning liability for orphan
shares).
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§ 113(f) if it has paid over its equitable share, but only to the ex-
tent that other PRPs have not paid their own equitable shares.69
Nevertheless, all PRPs involved in a § 107 cost recovery action
will absorb the orphan share of the response costs, significantly
reducing the plaintiff's total liability.70
II. THE CONTOURS OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER SECTION 113(f)
Before the enactment of SARA, courts determined the exis-
tence of an implied right of contribution under § 107.7 Section
113(f) of SARA codified this federal common law principle of
contribution.72 Section 113(f) permits a party held jointly and
severally liable to seek contribution from other PRPs if it has
assumed a disproportionate share of the cleanup CoStS.73 Typical-
69. See infra part II for a full discussion of contribution under CERCLA.
70. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal
Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992) (apportioning orphan share liability
among both plaintiffs and defendants in cost recovery action).
71. See United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1265 (D.
Del. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 228
(W.D. Mo. 1985); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31
(E.D. Mo. 1985); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo.
1985); Barbara J. Gulino, Note, A Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The
Case for Federal Common Law, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 668 (1986); Kristian E.
Anderson, Note, The Right to Contribution for Response Costs Under CERCLA,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 345 (1985).
72. See United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d
96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994) ("A principle goal of the new section 9613 was to
'clarif[y] and confirm[] the right of a person held jointly and severally liable
under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties, when
the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be
greater than its equitable share under the circumstances."') (quoting S. REP. No.
11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1176 (1995).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or poten-
tially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil ac-
tion under section 9606 ... or section 9607 of this title. Such claims shall be
brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as
the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the
right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil
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ly, EPA will focus their efforts on a limited number of PRPs at a
particular site and hold them liable for response costs.7 4 Due to
financial constraints and other impracticalities, the EPA only
focuses on a few financially viable PRPs to shoulder the entire
cost of the EPA's remediation or removal measures under
§ 107(a). 75 The PRPs singled out by the EPA must then attempt
to recover from the PRPs that the EPA failed to identify.76
Since § 113(f) divides liability among PRPs severally, a plain-
tiff PRP seeking contribution under § 113(f) will remain liable
for all costs less the equitable share of any defendants named in
the action. 77 The burden of proof in seeking apportionment re-
mains on the plaintiff PRP.7' A contribution plaintiff may seek
relief from another PRP only to the extent that it can establish
both the defendant's and its own share of the harm, and that, as a
defendant, it has paid more than its equitable share.79 Moreover,
the right of contribution, although enacted to promote fairness in
apportioning liability, does not mitigate the severity of CERCLA
liability if the plaintiff PRP can not locate a sufficient number of
additional solvent PRPs to shift the costs in excess of the
plaintiff's own equitable share."0 Since contribution only pro-
action under section 9606 ... or section 9607(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988).
74. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
76. See Sandy Shore, Environmental Detectives Track Down Polluters, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at B5 (discussing the use of investigators and their methods
for identifying PRPs).
77. SeeRhSTATEMENT (S*COND) OF TORTS § 886A (2) (1977) (stating that no
tortfeasor can be required to make a contribution above its own equitable share of
the liability); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "contribu-
tion" as the right of "one who has discharged a common liability to recover of
another also liable, the aliquot portion which he ought to pay or bear.").
78. H.R. REP. NO. 253, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3042; United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497,
1507-08 (6th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); see also Weber,
supra note 58, at 1474.
79. See United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1995) (quoting R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1507-08).
80. See, e.g., Steven B. Russo, Note, Contribution Under CERCLA: Judicial
Treatment After SARA, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 267 (1989) (proposing that
courts should make contribution liability joint and several to better apportion
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vides recovery on a several basis, the plaintiff may bear the bur-
den of paying for this "orphan share."'"
In contrast to cost recovery, contribution defendants may utilize
a broader array of defenses. z Specifically, § 113(f)(2), in order
to encourage settlement and reduce litigation costs, protects set-
tling parties from the contribution claims of other PRPs. 3 A
PRP may settle with the EPA and then pursue claims against
non-settling PRPs to recover response costs.8" The ability to as-
sert this settlement protection turns on whether the opposing
party's contribution claim relates to "matters addressed in the
settlement" as provided in § 113(t)(2). 5 It should be noted,
however, that the statute does not specify the manner in which a
court should determine the particular matters addressed by a
consent decree. 6
The language of § 113(f)(1) allows courts to consider equitable
factors in apportioning liability. 7 Courts have interpreted this
provision as encouraging a flexible approach for resolving contri-
bution claims.88 Consequently, courts have offered varying defi-
liability among solvent PRPs).
81. See Hansen, supra note 68, at 45; James A. Rogers, et al., Environmental
Law, Contribution and Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, C981 ALI-ABA
1, 35 (1995).
82. Section 113 expressly authorizes a court to implement such equitable
factors as it may deem appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988). See Town of
Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 1268, 1270 (7th Cir. 1994).
83. CERCLA § 113(f)(2) provides:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an ad-
ministrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does
not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so pro-
vide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the set-
tlement.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988). See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 51.
84. CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (1988).
85. CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
86. Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 765 (7th Cir. 1994).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
88. Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 765; Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron
& Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In determining the relative con-
tribution of the parties, courts must look to the 'totality of the circumstances."')
(quoting Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Ensco, Inc. 969 F.2d 503, 509 (7th
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nitions of "matters addressed." 9 For the most part, courts have
suggested that "matters addressed" by a consent decree be deter-
mined with reference to the particular location, time frame, haz-
ardous substances, and clean up costs covered in the agree-
ment.90
As the preceding discussion suggests, notwithstanding settle-
ment protection, contribution actions offer few remedies for PRPs
who have expended millions of dollars on cleanup costs for
which they were only partially responsible. Thus, it is strategical-
ly advantageous for PRPs to proceed under the § 107(a) cost
recovery action rather than the § 113(f) contribution action.
III. LIMITING PRP COST RECOVERY
By limiting the § 107(a) cost recovery claim to the government
and "innocent parties," some courts have characterized PRP re-
sponse cost claims as claims for contribution and not cost recov-
ery, regardless of whether the claim was initially pleaded under
§ 107(a) or § 113(f).9' These courts base their decisions on three
arguments: (1) PRPs are necessarily jointly and severally liable
parties, thus, any claim to reapportion costs among PRPs is a
"quintessential claim for contribution;"92 (2) allowing PRPs to
recover from other PRPs under § 107(a) would render part of
§ 113 meaningless; 93 and (3) PRP cost recovery claims introduce
uncertainty into the settlement process by forcing PRPs who have
already settled under § 113 to defend against cost recovery ac-
Cir. 1992)).
89. See Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 765.
90. Id. at 766; see United States v. Union Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1144, 1154
(E.D. Pa. 1990).
91. See United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1995); United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96,
102-03 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo Coatings, 30
F.3d at 764; Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1521 (D. Utah
1995); Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 901 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Pa.
1995); Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212, 1214-
15 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
92. See Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1536; Akzo coatings, 30 F.3d at 764.
93. See United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 102-03; Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d
at 1536.
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tions, even though the contribution bar in § 113 purports to pro-
tect them from future lawsuits."
In United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R.,95 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sought to "clarify the relationship
between cost recovery and contribution actions," and determine
the types of parties that could who could utilize each provi-
sion.96 The case involved a pesticide formulation facility in Col-
orado.97 The EPA initiated a CERCLA action against a number
of PRPs, including the Colorado & Eastern Railroad Company
("Colorado Railroad") and Farmland Industries, for injunctive
relief and cost recovery.98 Farmland entered into a partial con-
sent decree, agreeing to finance and perform all remediation and
to pay the EPA $700,000 for prior response costs, while Colorado
Railroad entered into its own consent decree agreeing to pay
$100,000. 9' The defendants in the EPA action filed cross claims
against each other, all of which were settled or dismissed before
trial, except for Farmland's claim against Colorado Railroad
which pled for cost recovery, or in the alternative, contribu-
tion."°
The district court awarded Farmland cost recovery under
§ 107's strict liability theory and denied Colorado Railroad con-
tribution protection under § 113(f)(2). 0 ' The Tenth Circuit re-
versed, ruling that Farmland's claim against Colorado Railroad
could only be classified as a claim for contribution."2 The court
stated, "[t]here is no disagreement that both parties are PRPs by
virtue of their past or present ownership of the site; therefore any
claim that would reapportion costs between these parties is the
quintessential claim for contribution."'0 3 The court also noted,
without explanation, that permitting PRPs to recover under
94. United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 102-03.
95. 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 1535.
97. Id. at 1532.
98. Id. at 1533.
99. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1533.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1533-34.
102. Id. at 1536.
103. Id.
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§ 107's strict liability scheme would render § 113(f) meaning-
less."°
After reserving decision, the United States District Court for
Utah followed the Tenth Circuit in Ekotek Site PRP Committee v.
Self, °5 disallowing the plaintiff PRPs' cost recovery claim and
characterizing the claim as one for contribution."° The action
arose from the operation of an oil refinery in Salt Lake City,
Utah. 7 The EPA assumed control of the site, began an emer-
gency removal to abate the release of hazardous substances, and
listed the Ekotek site on the National Priorities List ("NPL")108
pursuant to CERCLA § 105." The plaintiffs, numerous corpo-
rations connected to the site, formed a committee to respond to
the EPA orders and to negotiate with the EPA to undertake inves-
tigations and response activities at the site."0 The Committee
filed suit against a group of defendants alleged to have contrib-
uted to the site's contamination."'
At the summary judgment stage, the court disallowed the
Committee's cost recovery claim, restricting it to a claim for
contribution under § 113(f)." 2 The Committee attempted to dis-
tinguish Colorado & Eastern on the grounds that the responsible
parties in those cases had not "voluntarily" incurred response
costs by assisting in cleanup operations." 3 Nevertheless, the
court ruled that the broad language of the Tenth Circuit's opinion
104. Id. The court also barred Farmland's contribution claim as being a matter
addressed in the settlement for which Colorado Railroad's consent decree pro-
vided contribution protection. Id. at 1538.
105. 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Utah 1995).
106. Id. at 1521.
107. Id. at 1518.
108. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1994). The National Priorities List sets out, in
rank order, the sites of "priority releases for long term remedial evaluation and
response." Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988); Ekotek, 881 F. Supp. at 1518.
110. Ekotek, 881 F. Supp. at 1519.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1521. The court also ruled, however, that the Committee's contribu-
tion action was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations, because the
criteria necessary for the statute of limitations to begin running were never met.
Id. at 1522.
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clearly indicated that the decisive factor was the plaintiff's status
as a PRP and not whether the party voluntarily incurred response
costs." 4 Essentially, the court adopted the reasoning of Colora-
do & Eastern in disallowing PRP cost recovery.
In United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries,
Inc.,"5 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explicitly at-
tempted to define the relationship between cost recovery actions
and contribution actions under CERCLA." 6 Pursuant to a con-
sent decree, the plaintiff, United Technologies, had agreed to
undertake and complete remediation of a landfill in Winthrop,
Maine, and to reimburse the federal and state governments for
their response costs." 7 United Technologies then filed suit
against Browning-Ferris and other defendants alleging that they
shared responsibility for the site's contamination and seeking
three types of relief: (1) recovery of cleanup costs;"' (2) recov-
ery of moneys paid to the EPA and the State of Maine for re-
sponse costs;" 9 and (3) a declaration of rights with respect to
liability for future response costs. 20 The defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations had run
on the plaintiff's claim. 2' The case turned on whether the
plaintiff's action was one for cost recovery, subject to a six-year
statute of limitations, or one for contribution, subject to the three-
year statute of limitations. 122 The First Circuit surveyed the text
and structure of the statute and the plain meaning of contribution,
finding that "it [was] sensible to assume that Congress intended
114. Id. Parties often assert this "voluntariness" argument as a rationale for
allowing PRP cost recovery claims. See, e.g., Companies For Fair Alloc'n v. Axil
Corp. 853 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Conn. 1994). For a full discussion of the
voluntariness argument see infra notes 262-83 and accompanying text.
115. 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
116. Id. at 97.
117. Id.
118. The court referred to these costs as "reimbursed costs." Id. at 97.
119. The court referred to these costs as "first instance costs." Id.
120. Id. at 97-98.
121. Id. at 98.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (providing a six-year statute of limitations for
cost recovery actions); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (providing a three-year statute of
limitations for contribution actions).
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only innocent parties - not parties who were themselves liable
- to be permitted to recoup the whole of their expenditures."'' 3
The court further noted that "the statutory language ... suggests
that cost recovery and contribution actions are distinct and do not
overlap"'24 and it allows a PRP "only to seek recoupment of
that portion of his expenditures which exceeds his pro rata share
of the overall liability - in other words, to seek contribution
rather than complete indemnity.'25 United Technologies argued
that "the broad, unqualified language to the effect that responsible
parties shall be liable to 'any other person' ... provides an alter-
native avenue for the maintenance of their suit."'26 In rejecting
this argument, the court reasoned that allowing the PRP plaintiffs
to utilize the cost recovery provision and the accompanying six-
year statute of limitations would, in effect, nullify the three-year
statute of limitations in § 113(g) because all PRPs would file suit
under § 107 to take advantage of the longer statute of limita-
tions. 7
United Technologies, alternatively, argued that the phrase "in-
curred by" in § 107(a) only applies to actions to recoup cleanup
costs paid directly by the responsible party. 2 The court reject-
ed this argument as well, finding that:
[If a party's direct, first instance payments are not grist for the
contribution mill, but, instead, are to be treated as recovery costs
[only] within the purview of... [§ 107(a)], a nonsettling or later-
settling PRP would be entitled to bring an action against a respon-
sible party who settled at the earliest practicable moment, but paid
less than his ratable share of the aggregate first-instance payments.
Exposing early settlors who make first instance payment to later
contribution actions not only would create a needless asymmetry
123. United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 100.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 101.
127. Id. The court voiced its concern against a broad interpretation of the cost
recovery provision, stating, "[a]t face value, this expansive reading of ... [sec-
tion 107] is untenable; carried to its logical extreme, such a reading would com-
pletely swallow section 9613(g)(3)'s three-year statute of limitations associated
with actions for contribution .... [W]e refuse to follow a course that ineluctably
produces judicial nullification of an entire ... subsection." Id.
128. United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 101.
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in the treatment of first-instance costs as opposed to reimbursed
costs, but also would greatly diminish the incentive for parties to
reach early settlements with the government, thereby thwarting
Congress's discernible intent.'29
Nevertheless, the court recognized in a footnote that "a PRP who
spontaneously initiates a cleanup without governmental prodding
might be able to pursue an implied right of action for contribu-
tion under... [§ 107(a)]."' 3 ° Courts ruling against PRP cost
recovery axiomatically rely on this First Circuit ruling.'
In Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,32 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit also refused to allow the plaintiff
PRP ("Akzo") to characterize its action to recover response costs
as one for cost recovery, ruling that Akzo's claim was the "quint-
essential claim for contribution."'33 Akzo and numerous other
PRPs had initiated efforts to quantify the nature and extent of
their liability for a toxic waste site in Kingsbury, Indiana, pursu-
ant to a § 106 EPA cleanup order.'34 Most of the parties, in-
cluding defendant Aigner, entered into a consent decree with the
EPA. "'35 Akzo, however, withdrew from the group before sign-
ing a consent decree, concluding that it was not liable for con-
taminating the portion of the site targeted by the EPA.3 6 Akzo
then filed suit against Aigner for the costs it incurred while par-
ticipating in the initial stages of the cleanup.'37 The district
court granted Aigner's motion to dismiss on the grounds that
Akzo's claim was for contribution, not cost recovery.'38 The
court also ruled that the claim was for "matters addressed" in the
129. Id. at 103.
130. Id. at 99 n.8.
131. See United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995);
Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 901 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
132. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
133. Id. at 764.
134. Id. at 763.
135. Id.
136. Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 763.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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consent decree and therefore barred by contribution protec-
tion.13
9
On appeal, Akzo argued: (1) the claim was for cost recovery,
not contribution; and (2) the costs they sought to recover were
not related to matters addressed in the consent decree." The
Seventh Circuit agreed with the latter claim, but not the for-
mer. 14' The court stated, "[w]hatever label Akzo may wish to
use, its claim remains one by and between jointly and severally
liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of
them has been compelled to make ... . ""' Thus the court con-
cluded that the claim was properly governed by § 113(t).
The court declined to rule on whether Akzo's voluntary re-
sponse action with other PRPs, in anticipation of subsequent EPA
claims, would suffice to maintain a cost recovery action. 4 3 The
court simply concluded that these concerted efforts, which fo-
cused on the long term remediation of the site, were "a matter
addressed in the settlement."'" The court did, however, state
that other aspects of Akzo's work stood "apart in kind, context,
and time" from the work covered by the consent decree, and thus,
were not matters addressed. 4 ' Accordingly, the court allowed
Akzo to recover for work completed to abate the immediate
threat posed by the substances at the site, however, the court
ruled that the consent decree precluded Akzo from recovering for
139. Id.
140. Id. at 764.
141. Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764-68.
142. Id. at 764. The court pointed out that it declined to follow the cases that
suggested otherwise. Id. at 764-65. However, the court did provide an example of
a situation that would give rise to a direct claim under § 107(a): "a landowner
forced to clean up hazardous materials that a third party spilled onto its property
or that migrated there from adjacent lands." Id. at 764.
Akzo seems to contradict a previous Seventh Circuit case that allowed a
PRP to seek cost recovery. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746,
748 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994) ("The statute is clear that
whoever... incurs costs in cleaning up a contaminated site can seek to recover
them from any responsible person .....
143. Akzo, 30 F.3d at 765 n.6.
144. Id. at 764.
145. Id. at 767.
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the remedial work performed to accomplish a comprehensive
cleanup of the site."
In this case, the Seventh Circuit assumed that once the EPA
issued a § 106 cleanup order, Akzo was jointly and severally
liable even though the trial court had made no such a finding.47
This court and others ruling against PRP cost recovery base this
conclusion solely on the party's status as a PRP, without requir-
ing a finding of joint and several liability at the trial court lev-
el. 14
In Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp.,49 the
Northern District of California ruled on the viability of PRP cost
recovery claims. Noting that "liability is joint and several for cost
recovery actions but merely several for contribution actions," the
court held that any and all responsible parties were confined to
bringing contribution actions under § 113.150 The significance of
this decision lies in the court's rejection of the plaintiff's
"voluntariness argument."'' The case involved a 100 acre resi-
dential development located in Milpitas, California.'52 The Cali-
fornia Regional Water Quality Control Board, after finding hun-
dreds of barrels of toxic waste on the development site, issued an
abatement order. The order required plaintiffs, Kaufman and
Broad-South Bay ("K & B"), to investigate and remediate the
property and protect the water under and around the site.5 3 K &
B filed a CERCLA action to recover a portion of the cleanup
costs from defendant Unisys, the successor in interest to the al-
leged originator of the waste. 5 4
In an attempt to distinguish United Technologies,'55 K & B
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See discussion infra notes 234-46 and accompanying text.
149. 868 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
150. Id. at 1214-15.
151. See infra notes 262-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
voluntariness argument as a means for PRPs to seek cost recovery.
152. Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1214.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text for a full discussion of
United Technologies. The court noted that United Technologies was persuasive
APPORTIONING CERCLA LIABILITY
argued that a private PRP may bring a cost recovery action if it
has initiated a cleanup voluntarily and not as a result of civil
actions brought by the United States or a state. 156 Nevertheless,
the court followed the non-binding but persuasive reasoning of
United Technologies, ruling:
[w]hile it is true that the plaintiff in United Technologies had been
sued by the EPA, nothing in that case suggests that responsible
parties which have not been subject to a government action are
entitled to bring actions under § 9607(a) .... Thus, any and all re-
sponsible parties, even those who have expended response costs
voluntarily, are confined to bringing contribution actions under
§ 9613(f).915 7
The court noted, however, that if K & B could establish its non-
liability by invoking the "innocent landowner exception" ' it
would be entitled to bring a cost recovery action.
Similarly, in Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Ser-
vice,159 the Middle District of Pennsylvania disallowed PRP cost
recovery actions."W The plaintiff-owner, Gould, had ceased op-
erations of an automobile battery-breaking site in 1981, and the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources advised
him that no remediation or enforcement actions would result as
authority but not binding precedent before adopting that court's reasoning.
Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1215.
156. Kaufman 868 F. Supp. at 1214.
157. Id. at 1215.
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3) (1988). The innocent landowner
exception allows a party to escape liability on the basis of the § 9607(b) third
party defense if it acquired already contaminated property without knowing or
having reason to know of the prior contamination. To substantiate this claim, the
party must establish that "(1) it acquired the facility after the initial deposit of the
hazardous substances; (2) at the time of acquisition, [the party] did not know and
had 'no reason to know' that any hazardous substance was deposited at the facili-
ty; and (3) once the presence of the hazardous substance became known, [it]
exercised due care [under] the circumstances." In re Hemingway Transport, 993
F.2d 915, 932 (1st Cir. 1993); see Kaufman, 868 F. Supp. at 1216; Aaron
Gershonowitz & Miguel Padilla, Superfund's Innocent Landowner Defense: Elu-
sive Or Illusory?, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 626 (Oct. 16, 1991) (summarizing the
third-party and innocent landowner defenses and the key cases thereunder).
159. 901 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
160. Id. at 912-13.
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long as the site ceased operations. 161 The EPA began investi-
gating the site in 1987, however, and concluded that the site
posed "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health, welfare or the environment." 162 Gould entered into two
consent agreements with the EPA and asserted both a cost recov-
ery action and a contribution action.163 Upon defendants' motion
for partial summary judgment, the court ruled:
[b]ased on the numerous circuit holdings as well as the implicit
findings in the Third Circuit,' 6" when a [PRP] sues another
[PRP] to reapportion costs, that action will be a "contribution"
action pursuant to § 113.... In a factual situation ... like the
present action, where a responsible party initiates a site cleanup
pursuant to governmental pressure, and then sues another respon-
sible party to allocate the costs, the action falls under the provi-
sions of section 113.165
Gould also raised the issue of the orphan share, arguing that it
would be inequitable to hold it alone liable for this unaccounted-
161. Id. at 908.
162. Id. at 909.
163. Id.
164. The Court analyzed two Third Circuit cases and determined that it had
implicitly ruled against PRP cost recovery. The court looked at Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988) (allowing equi-
table defenses where a PRP filed suit under § 107) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029
(1989), and Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the
action brought by PRP was for contribution).
165. Gould, 901 F. Supp. at 913. The court distinguished the holding of Bethle-
hem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Industries, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995),
discussed fully infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text. The Gould Court
stated:
This Court is of the opinion that the Bethlehem court allowed a § 107 action by
focusing on CERCLA's goals of having responsible parties initiate cleanup ac-
tions voluntarily and promptly. Once again, in the instant action, Plaintiff Gould
did not voluntarily initiate cleanup of the ... site. Gould's cleanup actions were
the direct result of the EPA Consent Order of April, 1988. Thus, we reiterate our
support for the holding in Transtech Industries v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F.
Supp. 1079 (D. N.J. 1992) .... that when a party agrees to cleanup a site pursu-
ant to a settlement agreement, and sues another liable party, it is a claim for
contribution and must be distinguished from cases in which a plaintiff incurred
expenses upon its own initiated.
Gould, 901 F. Supp. at 911-12.
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for-portion of the remediation costs while the defendants who
bore responsibility for the same site would emerge without shoul-
dering any extra burden." The court dismissed this argument,
reasoning that since Gould prepared a list indicating each
defendants' contribution of waste to the site, "it would be inequi-
table for us to hold the defendants liable for any harm related to
the 'orphan shares' when this harm was clearly caused by entities
other than the defendants." 67 The court did not provide a de-
tailed explanation as to why Gould should bear more of the bur-
den then the other PRPs. As the first party to settle with the EPA,
Gould bore the extra burden of the "orphan share."
The court then considered the applicable statute of limitations
for the present action, and whether it barred the plaintiff's re-
maining contribution claim. 68 After characterizing the claim as
one for contribution, the court applied the corresponding statute
of limitations provided in § 113(g)(3). 69 The defendants argued
that Gould's § 106 consent order in 1988 triggered this three-year
statute of limitations, barring the present action filed in 1991.70
The court listed the four types of events that cause the statute to
run: "(1) the entry of a judgment; (2) a section 9622(g) de mini-
mis settlement; (3) a section 9622(h) cost recovery settlement;
and (4) a judicially approved settlement.''. Finding that the
consent order fit none of these four categories, the court allowed
Gould to proceed with the contribution claim.
7 2
The preceding cases illustrate the substantial authority disallow-
ing PRP cost recovery claims and limiting PRPs to claims for
contribution. The circuit and district court rulings analyzed above
suggest that PRPs may be totally precluded from the advantages
of joint and several liability. Such preclusion based on PRP status
will significantly affect the evolution of CERCLA litigation.'73
Practically speaking, the outcome of these cases may discourage
166. Id. at 908.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 913-15.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (3 year limitations period).
170. Gould, 901 F. Supp. at 914.
171. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
172. Gould, 901 F. Supp. at 914-15.
173. See discussion infra part IV.
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PRP voluntary cleanup and precipitate considerable practical and
financial difficulty in cleaning up hazardous waste sites."
IV. THE DECISIONS FOR PRP COST RECOVERY CLAIMS
Courts allowing PRP cost recovery claims under § 107(a) gen-
erally recognize a three factor analysis utilizing joint and several
liability.'75 These factors include: (1) the applicability of the Su-
preme Court's analysis in Key Tronic v. United States'76 in
which a PRP successfully sought cost recovery without having its
claim invalidated;' (2) the language and structure of § 107,
permitting the government and "any other person" to sue for cost
recovery, and suggesting that no "innocent parties" limitation is
mandated;' and (3) the incentive for voluntary cleanup that
cost recovery provides by giving PRPs a powerful means for
recovering expenses.' Most of the cases explicitly ruling in
favor of PRP cost recovery have come from district courts which
have received no guidance from their binding circuit courts. Nev-
ertheless, at least two circuits have allowed cost recovery for
PRPs 80
In Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. ENENCO, Inc.,8 ' the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit permitted a PRP cost recovery
claim. The plaintiff, a PRP for a seventy-acre landfill together
174. Id.
175. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
ENENCO, Inc., 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus.
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937
(1991); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); Companies For Fair Alloc'n v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D.
Conn. 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,
814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397
(D. N.J. 1991).
176. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
177. See Bethlehem, 891 F. Supp. at 225.
178. Id. at 224-25; Chesapeake & Potomac, 814 F. Supp. at 1277-78.
179. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d
1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1991); Kramer, 757 F.
Supp. at 410-11.
180. Velsicol Chem Corp. v. ENENCO, Inc., 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993);
Litton, 920 F.2d 1415.
181. 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993).
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with the city of Memphis, Tennessee, agreed to cooperate with
the EPA's cleanup plans. 2 The district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches 83 barred the
Velsicol's claim.' The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court
decision, noting the plaintiffs' PRP status, but characterizing their
claim as one for cost recovery, and allowed the plaintiff PRPs to
maintain both a § 107(a) cost recovery claim and a § 113(f) con-
tribution claim against the defendant PRPs 5 The court also
ruled that § 107 barred the laches defense, and that the action
was timely under the § 113(g)(2) statute of limitations."6 In bar-
ring the defendant's laches defense as mandated by § 107, the
court recognized that all claims among PRPs are not necessarily
for contribution.
Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automa-
tion Systems, Inc., 7 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
recognized the ability of a PRP to institute a cost recovery action.
The defendant contended that General Electric ("GE"), the plain-
tiff PRP, could not bring suit under § 107(a) because GE only
incurred response costs after learning of its probable liability.'
The court rejected this argument and upheld GE's cost recovery
claim, noting that "the purpose of allowing a private party to
recover its response costs is to encourage timely cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites.' 89
182. Id. at 526-27.
183. Under § 107, there are only three available defenses: act of god, act of
war, or act or omission of a third party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Thus the equitable
defense of laches did not apply. Id. at 530. Section 113, however, allows equita-
ble defenses. See Town of Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 27 F.3d 1268, 1270
(7th Cir. 1994).
184. Velsicol, 9 F.3d at 527.
185. Id. at 530-31.
186. Id. at 529-30.
187. 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 939 (1991).
188. Id. at 1417.
189. Id. at 1418.
[T]he motives of the private party attempting to recoup response costs under...
[section 107](a)(4)(B) are irrelevant. The purpose of allowing a private party to
recover its response costs is to encourage timely cleanup of hazardous waste
sites. This purpose would be frustrated if a plaintiff's motives were subject to
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In Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Industries, Inc.,19' the
plaintiffs sought cost recovery in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania under § 107 before any state or federal government agency
had taken action toward the site. 9' In denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court reasoned that the case
law and the text of CERCLA permitted the plaintiffs' § 107(a)
claims. 92 The court noted that although a split in authority ex-
isted, "[s]everal courts, including the Supreme Court, have per-
mitted PRPs to raise section 107(a) claims."' 93
The court looked to the Supreme Court's ruling in Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States.194 There, the Supreme Court recognized
that the plaintiff, a liable party that disposed of liquid chemicals
at a landfill in Washington State, was entitled to recover response
costs under "§ 107, which impliedly authorizes private parties to
recover cleanup costs from other PRP's [sic]."'95 Since the
question presented in Key Tronic was "whether attorney's fees
[were] 'necessary costs of response' within the meaning of
§ 107(a)(4)(B),"' 96 the Supreme Court did not explicitly address
the issue of whether only "innocent parties" may sue under
§ 107(a). Recognizing the limited significance of the Key Tronic
holding and the split among the courts which had addressed the
issue squarely, the court in Bethlehem looked to the statutory
language for guidance:
An examination of the text of sections 107 and 113 gives no indi-
cation that PRPs are prohibited from bringing claims pursuant to
section 107. First, section 107 imposes liability on PRPs for neces-
sary response costs incurred by "any other person .... ." While the
private right of action is implied [in Key Tronic].... the text
question. We will not look to the impetus behind a plaintiffs decision to begin the
cleanup process; we will look only to see if there has been a release or threatened
release for which the defendant is responsible.
Id.
190. 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
191. Id. at 222.
192. Id. at 223.
193. Id. at 224.
194. 114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994).
195. Id. at 1967.
196. Id. at 1963.
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provides no indication this implied right is limited to "innocent"
private parties. This broadly worded provision in conjunction with
the absence of the plaintiff's PRP status as a defense provided in
section 107(b) suggests that Congress intended section 107(a)
liability to sweep broadly .... Similarly, while the text of section
113(f) provides a right of action for private plaintiffs who volun-
tarily cleanup, it does not provide that section 113(f) is the exclu-
sive remedy for potentially liable parties. 97
Essentially, the court's analysis of the relevant statutory provi-
sions compelled its refusal to read in "innocent parties" where the
text read "any other person."
The court also addressed the policy arguments surrounding the
issue, noting that "permitting Plaintiffs to raise their section
107(a) claims comports with CERCLA's goal of encouraging
parties to initiate cleanup operations promptly and voluntari-
ly.' ' 8 Furthermore, the court addressed the imposition of joint
and several liability on the defendant and reasoned that the
defendant's counterclaim for contribution would remedy any un-
fairness in the liability scheme.'99 Thus, the court recognized
that a more equitable apportionment of liability would require
permitting PRP cost recovery and allowing a subsequent contribu-
tion by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff PRP from passing
on all of its liability.
In United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc.,2" the
Northern District of Indiana thoroughly surveyed the cases deal-
ing with PRP cost recovery claims and permitted SCA Services
("SCA") to maintain its cost recovery claim. SCA had agreed
with the EPA to undertake cleanup of the Fort Wayne Reduction
Site and to reimburse the government for oversight response
costs.2"' SCA then filed a third party complaint against a num-
ber of other PRPs for § 107(a) cost recovery, § 113(f) contribu-
tion, and a declaratory judgment.0 2 The third parties moved to
dismiss on the grounds that the only viable claim by SCA, a PRP
197. Bethlehem, 891 F. Supp. at 225 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 849 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
201. Id. at 1267-68.
202. Id. at 1268.
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third-party plaintiff, was for contribution, and that the statute of
limitations for contribution under § 113(g)(3) barred the
claim.2 3 The court, in allowing the PRP cost recovery claim,
relied on the plain language of CERCLA and SCA's Consent
Decree. The court refused to "consider[] SCA's participation in
the Consent Decree as a determination or admission of liabili-
ty... [and found] it difficult, if not impossible, to view SCA's
claim against the third-party defendants as a claim for contribu-
tion.""
Upon motion to reconsider, the court analyzed and distin-
guished three court of appeals cases.20 5 First, the court analyzed
Akzo Coatings and distinguished the Seventh Circuit's decision,
reasoning that in the case at bar, SCA had neither admitted liabil-
ity, nor been adjudicated liable, and thus, was not relegated to
contribution.' 6 Second, the court discussed United Technolo-
gies, 7 listing two reasons why that case did not apply: (1) al-
though the plaintiffs in United Technologies were settling parties
similar to SCA, the United Technologies plaintiffs had admitted
liability, whereas SCA had not;20 8 and (2) SCA receives the
203. Id. at 1269.
204. Id. at 1283.
205. United States v. SCA Servs. of Ind., 865 F. Supp. 533, 542-43 (N.D. Ind.
1994).
206. Id.
[The] Seventh Circuit acknowledged, without deciding, that under different facts
a party that incurred response costs may have "something other than a claim for
contribution".... Although this court obviously does not have the record in the
Akzo case before it, it seems readily apparent from the language of the Seventh
Circuit's opinion that Akzo [did] ... not disput[e it] was thus a liable party....
[However, as] SCA had never admitted liability, had never been adjudicated as a
liable party, and had entered into a consent decree that expressly was to not "con-
stitute an admission" but was only entered into to "avoid the costs of litigation,"
this court [finds] it "difficult, if not impossible, to view SCA's claim against the
third party defendants as a claim for contribution."
Id. (quoting the court's own prior opinion, 849 F. Supp. at 1283).
207. See supra notes 109-124 and accompanying text for a full discussion of
United Technologies.
208. SCA, 865 F. Supp at 545. Although the First Circuit stated that United
Technologies had admitted liability, the plaintiff took exception to that ruling in
its Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court. The Writ was subse-
quently denied. 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
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benefit of SARA § 122 which indicates that settlement would not
be consider an admission, in contrast to United Technologies
where the parties entered into a consent decree before the effec-
tive date of § 122.2' Thus, the plaintiffs in United Technologies
did not receive the benefit of § 122, but SCA plaintiffs did re-
ceive such a benefit.2 0
Finally, the SCA Court discussed Town of Munster v. Sherwin-
Williams Co.,21 1 found that Munster dealt primarily with the
question of equitable defenses, and thus it did not undermine the
decision to allow SCA's cost recovery action.1 Thus, the SCA
court allowed the PRP cost recovery claim because the plaintiff
PRP had voluntarily incurred cleanup costs.
The District of Connecticut adopted and clarified the reasoning
of SCA Services in Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil
Corp."3 The plaintiffs in this case sought to recover, under
§§ 107 and 113, present and future response costs in connection
with a public landfill listed on the NPL.214 The defendants
moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)"' on the grounds that the
exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs as PRPs is one for contribu-
tion, and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under
§ 113(f).216 The court surveyed the cases on point and conclud-
ed:
While CERCLA is silent as to whether "any other person" in-
cludes other PRPs, a number of courts have found that allowing
PRPs to pursue § 107 actions is consistent with the broad scope of
liability that Congress intended .... [I]f PRPs were precluded
from pursuing claims for joint and several liability under § 107,
and limited to contribution claims and several liability, "a PRP
who is otherwise amenable to cleanup may be discouraged from
doing so if it knows that, where the harm is indivisible, its only
209. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988).
210. SCA, 865 F. Supp at 545.
211. 27 F.3d 1268 (1994).
212. SCA, 865 F. Supp. at 546-47.
213. 853 F. Supp. 575 (D. Conn. 1994).
214. Id. at 577.
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
216. Companies For Fair Alloc'n, 853 F. Supp. at 578.
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recourse for reimbursement is contribution from the solvent
PRPs."
2 17
The court also discussed SCA Services:
[T]he [SCA] court reconciled the conflicting authority on this issue
by distinguishing between cases where a nonsettling party at-
tempted to recover response costs from a settling party, and cases
in which a settlor has sought to recover response costs from
nonsettlors. In the former category of cases, a § 107 claim impli-
cates and threatens to undermine the contribution protection provi-
sion of § 113(f)(2). Thus, to determine the viability of such a
claim, courts must balance the competing goals of protecting set-
tling parties from contribution and encouraging parties to initiate
cleanup operations promptly and voluntarily. In the latter category
of cases, to which this case belongs, where the defendants are
nonsettlors, there are no such competing goals and the majority of
courts have permitted the settling plaintiff to proceed with a § 107
action."8
The court recognized the delicate balance between suits among
PRPs and the mandates of contribution protection. 9 Neverthe-
less, the court adopted the reasoning of SCA Services, allowed the
cost recovery claim, and refused to penalize a voluntary PRP for
complying with CERCLA's mandates.
Other district court decisions stress the equitable value of PRP
cost recovery claims, looking beyond the voluntariness argument
relied on by the court in SCA. In Chesapeake & Potomac Tele-
phone Co. of Virginia v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,22° the Eastern
District of Virginia attempted to find an equitable solution by
permitting a PRP cost recovery claim. The court granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and imposed joint and
several liability on the defendants for all costs not attributable to
the plaintiff.22 Nevertheless, the court retained jurisdiction to
217. Id. at 579 (quoting Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691
F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
218. Id. at 579-80 (discussing United States v. SCA Servs. of Indiana, Inc., 865
F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Ind. 1994)).
219. Since a settling party brought the claim in question against a non-settlor,
the question of contribution protection did not arise. Id.
220. 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
221. Id. at 1281.
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apportion liability "in an equitable fashion." '222 This judicial ma-
neuver streamlined the litigation and insulated the defendants
from the portion of liability attributable to Chesapeake & Poto-
mac.223 In the court's interpretation of § 107:
in the absence of a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary," the language of the statute itself "must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive."224 Nothing in the statute indicates that
only "innocent" persons fall within the definition of "any other
person." Therefore, the Court interprets the term "person" in Sec-
tion 107 in accord with the definition of that term provided by the
statute itself.
225
Essentially, the court read the plain meaning of the statute to
allow the PRP to sue under § 107, but in fairness the court re-
quired the plaintiff to still pay its fair share of the cleanup costs.
The Chesapeake & Potomac court relied heavily on the District
of New Jersey's decision in United States v. Kramer."6 In
Kramer, the United States filed suit against numerous defendants
to recover § 107(a) response costs in connection with the Helen
Kramer Landfill in Mantua, New Jersey.2 7 After the United
States moved to strike numerous affirmative defenses under
§ 107, the defendants argued that their counterclaim against the
United States would change the action from cost recovery to con-
tribution since the United States was itself a PRP, and thus equi-
table defenses would apply.28 In the course of rejecting this ar-
gument and approving PRP cost recovery, the court stated:
Collapsing the distinction between section 107 and section 113
ignores the clear language and structure of the statute....
[S]ections 107 and 113 serve distinct purposes.. . . Section 107
permits the Government or a private party to go in, clean up the
222. Id. at 1277.
223. Id. at 1277-78. The court also ruled that the harm was indivisible and that
the moving defendants failed to establish the innocent landowner defense. Id. at
1280-81.
224. Id. at 1277 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
225. Id.
226. United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991).
227. Id. at 404.
228. Id. at 405.
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mess, pay the bill, then collect all its costs not inconsistent with
the NCP from other responsible parties--even if plaintiff was also
responsible for the contamination. Any PRP is entitled under sec-
tion 113 to bring a contribution action against other PRPs--includ-
ing the PRP who previously cleaned up the mess and was paid for
its trouble through a section 107 proceeding--to apportion costs
equitably among all the PRPs. Practically speaking, section 107
permits a PRP, including the government, to collect all its re-
sponse costs, even those that the same PRP may be required to
pay back to other PRPs as its equitable share in a section 113 pro-
ceeding.
What might be called a windfall for a plaintiff PRP in a section
107 action serves as an incentive for private PRPs to clean up
hazardous waste sites, to risk their own capital initially, knowing
that by then prevailing in a section 107 action, they will be reim-
bursed perhaps in excess of what might be shown in a section 113
action to have been there equitable share. If the courts collapse the
distinction between a section 107 and 113 proceeding [converting
this section 107 action to a 113 action], there will be less incentive
for private parties to initiate clean up, since they would lose the
use of that temporary windfall gained in a section 107 action. 29
The courts allowing PRP cost recovery claims often rely on the
Kramer Court's detailed analysis of the two causes of action.23
This examination of the relationship between cost recovery and
contribution demonstrates that PRP cost recovery protects all
parties involved in CERCLA litigation. Cost recovery does not
preclude any party from recovering expenses over its own equita-
ble share and serves as an incentive to remedying years of envi-
ronmentally irresponsible conduct.
IV. PRP COST RECOVERY: A MORE EQUITABLE
APPORTIONMENT OF CERCLA LIABILITY
An analysis of the preceding cases ruling explicitly or implicit-
ly on the issue of PRP cost recovery demonstrates the uncertainty
in what the future may hold for PRPs who seek to recover the
response costs incurred from hazardous waste cleanup. Although
229. Id. at 416-17 (emphasis added).
230. Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,
814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
APPORTIONING CERCLA LIABILITY
the majority of recent cases have ruled against PRP cost recovery,
the opportunity still remains for PRPs to prevail on this issue.
The arguments against PRP cost recovery have gained favor in
those circuits, but other persuasive circuits have not directly ad-
dressed the issue.23" ' PRPs in the difficult position of attempting
to recover what often amounts to millions of dollars spent on
cleanup must bear the burden of convincing these courts that PRP
cost recovery actions serve the goals and spirit of CERCLA.
The courts favoring PRP cost recovery claims rely on two
principal arguments: (1) the plain meaning of the statute favors
PRP cost recovery;2 32 (2) PRP cost recovery serves CERCLA's
objective of encouraging rapid voluntary cleanup by responsible
parties.233
A. The Plain Meaning of the Statute
The plain language of CERCLA strongly supports the viability
of PRP cost recovery claims. As one court taking this position
has stated, "[tihere is nothing in the language of the statute...
that precludes a [liable] party ... under CERCLA, to initiate
cleanup and sue to recover its costs under section 107.""
CERCLA "specifically provides that covered persons shall be
liable to both the United States Government, among others, and
231. See Town of Wailkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (recognizing that the Second Circuit has not ruled on whether cost recov-
ery is limited to only "innocent parties"); United States v. J.M. Taylor, 909 F.
Supp. 355, 366 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (allowing PRP cost recovery and predicting that
the Fourth Circuit would decline to follow those cases which limit all PRPs to
contribution).
232. See Bethlehem, 891 F. Supp. 221; Chesapeake & Potomac, 814 F. Supp.
1269; Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397; Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming,
Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
233. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, 966 F.2d 837, 841
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting private cost recovery under section 107(a) is intended to
encourage private cleanup); accord Fisher Dev. Co. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 37
F.3d 104 (3rd Cir. 1994); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,
851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988); Bethlehem, 891 F. Supp. 221; Chesapeake & Po-
tomac, 814 F. Supp. 1269; Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397; Allied, 691 F. Supp. 1100;
Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285,
1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
234. Chesapeake & Potomac, 814 F. Supp. at 1277.
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'to any other person who incurs response costs."' 35 The broad
wording of this provision suggests that Congress intended no lim-
itation on who can sue under § 107.236 Moreover, "while the
text of section 113(f) [contribution] provides a right of action for
private plaintiffs who voluntarily clean up, it does not provide
that § 113(f) contribution is the exclusive remedy for potentially
liable parties. 237
Normal methods of statutory interpretation counsel against
limiting § 107 to "innocent parties" only.238 Without a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary the plain language
of the statute should "ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. 239
An ordinary reading of both sections indicates that § 113 does
not abrogate § 107 in the context of PRP cost recovery, "but in-
stead [§ 113] codifies the efforts of federal courts to imply a
contribution remedy to assist those held jointly and severally lia-
ble."2' By grafting the meaning "innocent parties only" on to
§ 107, which reads "any other person," it appears that courts
disfavoring PRP cost recovery have engaged in conscious judicial
nullification of the statute, "and add[ed] needless confusion to the
determination of who may utilize section 107. '241 Although
those courts often state the proposition that allowing PRP cost
recovery would render § 113 meaningless,242 a thorough analy-
sis of the integral CERCLA provisions contradicts this view. For
example, the plain language of the § 113(f) contribution action
reinforces the argument that the courts disfavoring PRP cost
recovery are misinterpreting the state with regard to PRP cost
235. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)) (emphasis added).
236. Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221, 225
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
237. Id. (emphasis added); accord United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355,
363 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
238. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (discussing "familiar canon of statutory construction that
the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.").
239. Id.
240. Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931, 938-39 (C.D.
Cal. 1993) (allowing PRP cost recovery claim).
241. United States v. J.M. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355, 363 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
242. See United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d
96, 100 (lst Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).
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recovery.243 Section 113(f) states that "any person may seek
contribution" during or after a cost recovery action, thus indicat-
ing that the statute is permissive rather than mandatory.2" The
§ 113(f)(1) contribution action does not specify its application
only to certain types of claimants. Rather, by its terms it applies
to "any person.""24 Moreover, the language of § 107, by allow-
ing, but not mandating parties to bring cost recovery before con-
tribution, implies that PRP claims are not always in the nature of
contribution.2"
B. Comparing the Statutes of Limitations
A comparison of the statutes of limitations for cost recovery
and contribution actions reinforces the impression that the lan-
guage of § 107 provides for PRP cost recovery.247 Although the
court in United Technologies ruled that such an expansive reading
of § 107 is untenable because carried to its logical extreme, it
would render the three-year statute of limitations associated with
contribution claims meaningless,2" the Bethlehem Iron Court
has proposed a persuasive counter argument:
The statute of limitations for a contribution claim begins to run on
the date of judgment, administrative order, or entry of a judicially
approved settlement concerning costs or damages. By contrast, the
statute of limitations on a claim to recover removal costs begins to
run after completion of the removal, and a claim to recover reme-
dial costs begins to run after initiation of physical on-site construc-
tion. If parties that voluntarily cleanup are permitted to raise
claims only pursuant to section 113(f), it seems strange that no
statute of limitations applies to these parties. Thus, the court be-
lieves that the text of sections 107 and 113 suggest that section
107 creates a right of action for potentially responsible parties.249
243. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1118
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (discussing CERCLA § 107(a)).
247. Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221, 225
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
248. United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 101.
249. Bethlehem, 891 F. Supp. at 225.
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Here, the Bethlehem court has discarded the argument that PRP
cost recovery would negate the statute of limitations provisions
associated with contribution, § 113(g)(3). 5 ° The court recog-
nized that if PRPs who clean up voluntarily can not seek cost
recovery, then no statute of limitations would apply to them be-
cause the statute of limitations for contribution only begins to run
on the date of a judgment, administrative order, or judicially
approved settlement."' Voluntary PRPs may not be involved in
any of these triggering events, thus no statute of limitations
would apply to them.252 The statute of limitations associated
with cost recovery actions, however, § 113(g)(2), 3 begins to
run when a party initiates remedial action. Therefore, this statute
of limitations could apply to voluntary PRPs, whereas
254§ 113(g)(3)could not.
The court in United States v. SCA Services 5 also disagreed
with the First Circuit's analysis of the two statutes of limitations
in United Technologies. In SCA, the court found that both statutes
of limitations served separate purposes and did not counsel
against allowing a PRP cost recovery claim. 256 The court rea-
soned that Congress provided a shorter statute of limitations for
contribution because such claims generally concern liquidated
sums. 5 7 In contrast, Congress provided a longer statute of limi-
tations for cost recovery simply because the extent of such claims
might not be identified for several years while mediation among
the parties occurred.25 '
A reading of § 107(a) to allow only innocent parties to seek
cost recovery contradicts the plain meaning in another way: it
disallows virtually all parties other than the government from
suing under this section. Courts ruling against PRP cost recovery
250. Id.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
252. Bethlehem, 891 F. Supp. at 225.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
255. 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1283-84 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1283.
258. Id.
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have dismissed this limiting effect in cursory fashion, merely
stating that "in certain circumstances private parties can sue under
section 107. "259 Nevertheless, the example that these courts
point to, the "innocent landowner" defense, is essentially that of a
party who has a defense to liability, and thus, is an "innocent
party." Under the reasoning of these courts, only the government
may seek cost recovery, thereby eliminating the private right of
action that has existed under § 107(a) since the enactment of
CERCLA.2 6 Such a result wholly contradicts the Supreme
Court's finding that "the § 107 provisions outlining the liabilities
and defenses of persons against whom the Government may
assert claims ... impliedly authorize[s] such a cause of ac-
tion."26
B. PRP Cost Recovery Actions Comport with the Purpose of
CERCLA
Courts generally agree that in enacting CERCLA and SARA,
Congress intended to facilitate rapid voluntary removal and
remediation of hazardous waste sites. 262 This paramount objec-
tive corresponds directly with the readiness of private parties to
undertake response actions. As one court remarked:
CERCLA seeks the expeditious and safe cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. A blanket prohibition against joint and several liability
in claims between responsible parties would discourage a willing
PRP from cleaning up on its own. This is especially true where
one or more of the parties are insolvent and, thus incapable in
sharing the costs of cleanup.... A prohibition against joint and
several liability would leave the willing PRP holding the bag for
the insolvent companies [by requiring them to pay for the or-
phaned share]. On the other hand, a willing PRP would be encour-
259. See United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris, Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d
96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
260. See supra note 47 discussing private right of action.
261. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1965 (1994).
262. See Healy, supra note 4, at 76 ("Congress intended that the CERCLA
liability scheme encourage other parties to pursue cleanups not financed by
Superfund."); Note, Developments In The Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1458, 1496-97 (1986).
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aged to clean up where the law leaves open the possibility that the
PRP could recover all costs as against nonwilling, solvent PRPs
under a theory of joint and several liability. 63
PRP cost recovery claims "serve[] as an incentive for private
parties to clean up hazardous waste sites, to risk their own capital
initially, knowing that by then prevailing in a section 107 ac-tion ' the PRP will recoup more of its costs than under the re-
strictive § 113 several liability scheme. In fact, allowing PRP cost
recovery claims serves as a settlement incentive. If PRPs can
recover on a joint and several basis against other PRPs, those
who the EPA target will more readily settle with the government
and begin the cleanup process. Rather than litigating against the
government and burdening the courts, PRPs can settle with the
government, avoid costly litigation, obtain a fixed determination
of their liability, and use their resources to clean up the waste
and identify the other responsible parties.265
To facilitate private cleanups, Congress added settlement provi-
sions with SARA § 122."6 Congress recognized that private re-
sponse actions may cost less than government cleanups and may
allow EPA to focus its efforts and resources more efficiently on
the facilities that pose the greatest threat to human health and the
environment.267 Section 122 and related provisions incorporate a
"carrot and stick" approach to promote voluntary involvement in
the remediation process.26 CERCLA threatens PRPs with the
joint and several liability "stick" if they fail to settle with EPA,
but also offers the "carrot" of settlement protection for voluntary
cleanup. 269 Disallowing PRP cost recovery contradicts this
approach because it shifts the responsibility for virtually all of the
response costs to settling PRPs.
263. Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1118
(N.D. I11. 1988).
264. United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416-17 (D.N.J. 1991).
265. See Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley & Sons, 915 F. Supp. 159
(W.D. Ky. 1995).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (1988).
267. See Healy, supra note 4, at 76.
268. See Organ, supra note 19, at 1066.
269. Id.
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PRPs necessarily "[assess] their chances in a future law
suit 270 when deciding whether to proceed with cleanup efforts.
If settling PRPs face the possibility of shouldering the entire
burden of the response costs for a particular site, there is less of
an incentive to settle and begin cleanup, and more incentive to
challenge the EPA in court.2 71 Thus, allowing PRP cost recov-
ery claims encourages parties to align with CERCLA's goal of
rapid voluntary cleanup, whereas disallowing PRP cost recovery
contradicts the discernible carrot and stick approach that Congress
has taken.
PRP cost recovery has potential advantages for both the gov-
ernment and private parties by promoting earlier settlement and
remediation.272 It enables the government and private parties to
initiate both types of recovery actions against nonsettling par-
ties.273 This benefits the government because by obtaining an
immediate settlement or commitment to remediation, or both, the
cleanup process accelerates and the government and the PRP can
direct their efforts toward pursuing other PRPs .1 4 For PRPs in
particular, early settlement eliminates the threat of severe non-
compliance penalties, and the costs that accumulate daily when
parties do not have a precise determination of their role in the
liability for response costs at a particular site. Moreover, permit-
ting PRP cost recovery rewards environmentally conscious PRPs
who align themselves with a paramount goal of Congress-the
voluntary initiation of response efforts to hazardous substance re-
lease.
Courts in favor of PRP cost recovery actions have recognized
that voluntary cleanup does not constitute an admission of liabili-
ty under CERCLA.275 Since the nature of a contribution action
is for joint and severally liable parties to seek reimbursement for
270. Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Thomas, 730 F. Supp. 771, 774 (W.D. Ky.
1990), aff'd, 927 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991).
271. See Organ, supra note 19, at 1067-68.
272. See Ferrey, supra note 2, at 94-95.
273. Id. at 95.
274. United States v. J.M. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355, 363 (M.D. N.C. 1995).
275. Id. at 364 ("It is difficult to understand why being the target or victim of
such a draconian [§ 106] order [without an adjudication of guilt] should disquali-
fy one from seeking out others who are also liable.").
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what they have paid over and above their equitable share, an
action by a voluntary PRP is not necessarily one for contribution.
The recent court decisions agree that § 107 and § 113 are sepa-
rate and distinct actions for recovering response costs. By auto-
matically construing PRP cost recovery actions as solely in the
nature of contribution, however, numerous courts fail to recognize
the significant difference between the two types of recovery.276
To contrast the two provisions, the cost recovery claim is an
original claim to recover money that a private party has spent on
its own response measures, while the contribution claim is a de-
rivative claim in which a party adjudged jointly and severally
liable seeks to implead a third party to carry its share of the ex-
pense. 77 Therefore, where a PRP incurs response costs, but is
not adjudicated liable, a cost recovery action should be available
to them because they are bringing an original claim. Where the
government has sued a PRP and imposed upon that party liability
for EPA response costs, a subsequent PRP claim is then in the
nature of a derivative claim or contribution. By failing to make
the distinction between a PRP that voluntarily incurs response
costs and a PRP that has been adjudicated liable, courts ruling
against PRP cost recovery claims have misinterpreted the two
sections and bootstrapped all PRP claims into claims for contribu-
tion.
Congress added § 122 with SARA to ensure that courts would
not consider voluntary cleanup actions by a party as an admission
of CERCLA liability.2 78 There seems no other logical purpose
for the addition of this provision if not to allow private parties,
even those that meet the statutoiy definition of a PRP, to rightful-
ly bring cost recovery actions. Otherwise, the need for § 122's no
admission provision remains elusive. The more equitable solution
to the problem of apportioning CERCLA liability is to allow
PRPs who initiate cleanup actions before any judicial determina-
276. Id. ("The construction of Section 107 [against use by PRPs] fails to give
due deference to one of the major principles underlying it.").
277. See id. at 362 (noting that a party must actually incur response costs be-
fore seeking cost recovery).
278. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(C) (1988).
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tion of liability to seek cost recovery, while limiting those ad-
judged liable to contribution claims.
The need for an equitable solution to the problem of the orphan
share also supports the viability of PRP cost recovery. Allowing
voluntary PRPs to bring cost recovery actions will encourage
private cleanup actions while spreading the burden to pay for the
orphan share.279 Since CERCLA focuses on closed or aban-
doned sites that contain hazardous substances, many parties who
contaminated sites in the past are insolvent and therefore unable
to pay for their share of the cleanup costs. The remaining solvent
parties found liable face the possibility of paying for this orphan
share of the expense.28 By prohibiting PRP cost recovery, the
PRP who voluntarily removes and remediates at a hazardous
waste site may have to shoulder the entire burden of the orphan
share. This becomes a reality for a PRP which, in its subsequent
contribution action against other viable PRPs, can only shift to
the contribution defendants their equitable share."' Although it
seems extremely inequitable to hold a limited number of liable
parties responsible for the entire orphan share, courts have ruled
in this manner. 2 With this looming obstacle, it seems likely
that many parties will refrain from undertaking voluntary
279. The court in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Peck
Iron and Metal Co. addressed the need for an equitable allocation of the orphan
share, indicating that although the plaintiff could prevail on a section 107 cost
recovery claim, during the contribution phase of the case the court would divide
the orphan share among all parties in proportion to each party's final amount of
liability for the site's remediation as determined in the subsequent contribution
action. 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (E.D. Va. 1992).
280. The 104th Congress recognized the problem of the orphan share. S. 1834,
104th Cong. 1st Sess. § 702 (1995). Congress failed to pass a proposal that
would explicitly allocate payment for the orphan shares out of the Superfund. Id.
281. See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire Serv., 901 F. Supp. 906,
913 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding contribution plaintiff liable for entire orphan
share).
282. Id.
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cleanup."8 3 Thus, limiting PRPs to § 113(f) contribution actions
frustrates one of Congress's foremost goals in enacting CERCLA.
CONCLUSION
For PRPs, CERCLA liability often seems like a no-win situa-
tion, and the recent cases seem to support this notion. The mes-
sage set forth in these cases is that forthright private parties who
enter settlements, clean up sites, and seek to recover costs from
unwilling PRPs will receive no special benefit for their legal and
environmental conscientiousness. This message will deter PRPs
from taking responsibility for hazardous waste. Nevertheless,
PRPs should continue to argue for PRP cost recovery as the more
equitable treatment where parties seek to shoulder the responsibil-
ity for their fair share of the cleanup. PRPs have a strong argu-
ment that the plain language of CERCLA, and congressional
intent to promote rapid voluntary cleanup, support PRP use of
joint and several liability under § 107 cost recovery. Finally, the
courts that will undoubtedly face the issue in the future should
reward the environmentally conscious PRPs who voluntarily incur
response costs in accordance with the purpose and spirit of
CERCLA and the goal of preserving the environment for future
generations.
283. See Organ, supra note 19, at 1057 ("The disproportionate burden borne by
settling PRPs increases the likelihood of (1) disputes with the EPA concerning
the settling PRPs' performance of the selected remedy (as the settling PRPs seek
to minimize their liability) and (2) litigation between settling PRPs and recalci-
trant PRPs (as the settling PRPs seek to recover their response costs)."). Essen-
tially, the inequity of holding one PRP liable for the orphan share leaves the PRP
with no incentive to settle and begin cleanup, and provides considerable incentive
for PRPs to try their luck in court.
